PhaenEx review: How to keep what is out of sight in mind? Nature is much more than what we can see, and this encounter with Critical Ecologies seeks to explicate several tensions in the conceptualization of nature: between the visible and the invisible, the human and the non-human, the calculable and the incalculable, and the rational and the irrational.
These tensions are central to the paradoxes of contemporary ecological crises that Andrew Biro sets out in his Introduction to Critical Ecologies. The first paradox is that the more power humans have over nature, the more vulnerable they are becoming to ecological catastrophes-and the more vulnerable humans become, the more science asserts mankind's responsibility for fixing the problem. This difficulty is compounded by the second paradox:
although the technology for meeting basic human needs is present, inequality has reached an "unprecedented level" (Biro 5) . The third paradox addresses the environmental movement itself, which Biro argues has not been able to mobilize collective political responses to the growing body of knowledge on widespread climate change. To counter this inaction, environmentalists must address both the need for "immediate action" and "far deeper attitudinal changes" towards nature (Biro 8) . It is with this third paradox that the authors in this anthology make an important contribution to understanding nature not just as a physical thing that needs protection, but as a concept that itself needs to be sustainable if humans are to tackle the current environmental crises. The authors here bring to the surface those "out of sight" understandings of nature.
The sections of the book make up a "loose narrative framework" that map onto these paradoxes (Biro 9) . Part One, on "Science and the Mastery of Nature," revisits the Frankfurt School's domination of nature thesis in the context of contemporary scientific discourses and practices. In an effort to address the third paradox above, the essays in Part Two, "Critical Theory, Life, and Nature," turn to and offer a critique of the philosophies of deep ecology. Part Steven Logan Three, "Alienation and the Aesthetic," builds upon work that has brought together Cultural Studies with the Frankfurt School, in an effort to bridge divides between nature, culture, and technology. Finally, Part Four, on "Critical Theory's Moment," argues most explicitly for the continuing relevance of the Frankfurt School by considering it in light of contemporary theory. It is the very inter-disciplinary nature of the text-particularly in these last two sections-that makes it relevant not just for political theory, but also for work in Science and Technology Studies and Environmental Cultural Studies, two areas which have in large part steered clear of Frankfurt School critical theory. For researchers interested in the connections between the Frankfurt School and environmentalism, this is a key text, as it brings together many authors who have previously published works on both the Frankfurt School and its connection with nature and ecology. The essays also provide excellent overviews of many of the complicated ideas and concepts of the Frankfurt School, which makes it suitable for readers who do not have a background with this school and its thinkers.
By way of entering into the arguments of this anthology I want to begin with Steven Vogel's contention, in his essay "On Nature and Alienation" (from Part Three), that Adorno and Horkheimer's dialectic of enlightenment ends in a cul-de-sac (Biro 200) . This reiterates the argument he makes in his 1996 book Against Nature. I have turned to this argument as a starting point because Biro's anthology is trying to offer a way out of the paradoxes of environmental crises through the Frankfurt School, whereas Vogel argues that following Adorno and Horkheimer's dialectic of enlightenment will only lead to further paradoxes and contradictions for environmentalists. Vogel's work also merits attention as it surfaces in a number of essays in this volume (e.g., in essays by Biro, Leiss, Farrell, Gunster, and Short).
Adorno and Horkheimer argue that the relentless pursuit of the Enlightenment goal of PhaenEx autonomy turns against itself as modern subjects, motivated by a desire for complete control of outer nature, forget the nature within themselves. Desire for control stems from the fear of that which is unknown, that which cannot be identified and named: "nothing is allowed to remain outside, since the mere idea of the 'outside' is the real source of fear" (Adorno and Horkheimer 11). The more humans try to control external nature, the more they unwittingly dominate their inner nature, and, as Vogel puts it in Against Nature, "by the end of the dialectic the subject has entirely ... dissolved into the very nature over which enlightenment had promised it control" (57).
Vogel takes issue with the idea that humans can somehow be alienated from something called "nature." In this sense, he argues that Adorno and Horkheimer's thinking is also marked by a "palpable nostalgia" for an idea of nature that precedes practice, and which "their materialism assures them is there but which their epistemology guarantees is unattainable" (Biro 200) . Here, Vogel is referring to Adorno's understanding of non-identity. The non-identity of Negative Dialectics says that "the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived" (Adorno 5).
Adorno offers a "disenchantment of the concept" by focusing on the "nonconceptuality" of the concept (Adorno 13). But claiming nature exists, counters Vogel, and then arguing that something of it can never be known, Adorno and Horkheimer's argument cannot provide a critical theory of nature. In other words, to recognize the paradoxes of the dialectic of enlightenment, that it is irony all the way down, is not going to get the world's countries closer to a global climate deal.
Vogel's thesis in this anthology is that humans are not alienated from some unknowable nature or pre-human environment, but from a "built environment" that "has always already been affected by human action" (Biro 202 . Reiterating the need for rational social and ecological relations, Leiss calls for a utopian vision of a society that reconciles the tension between these two sciences (Biro 34) . Although the turn to utopia is interesting here, as many other authors in the anthology do the same, my contention is that Vogel and Leiss attribute too much power to human society, and not enough power to the non-human and to a more radical understanding of the idea of nature.
Christoph Görg, in his essay on "Societal Relationships with Nature," also argues that the domination of nature is to some degree necessary for human life to continue, but he also attempts to offer a nuanced understanding of Benjamin's "mastery" that accounts for the non-identity of nature. In typical dialectical fashion, domination (Herrschaft) and mastery (Beherrschung) have PhaenEx negative and positive connotations depending on the context in which they are used. Benjamin, for example, seems to use mastery in its positive sense, as do many of the authors here. The domination of nature implies a neglect of nature's non-identity insofar as "nature has its own meaning" (Biro 49 ). Görg's approach, though, is not to draw out the aesthetic side of the nonidentity of nature, as other authors do in subsequent sections, but to deploy it as a critique of the domination of nature. It is not that the non-identity of nature is some primordial pre-social, and hence unknowable nature, but it is a critique of the cultural and scientific ways that nature is constructed (Biro 51) . Nature does exist for itself and to think otherwise simply promotes the illusion of human autonomy. At the same time, nature can only be experienced in some mediated way. The separation and "constitutive interconnection" between nature and society can pave the way for a "utopian reconciliation between nature and society" (Biro 50). Katharine Farrell's essay "The Politics of Science: Has Marcuse's New Science Finally Come of Age?" also engages with the need to master technology, and specifically science: what humans do not need is more mastery of nature-that project has been wholly achieved-but "liberation from a set of human-generated technological and social systems" that only perpetuate and deepen the domination of nature (Biro 74) . Farrell returns to Marcuse's call in OneDimensional Man for a "new science" that would reintroduce critique "into a world dominated by one-dimensional technological rationality" (Biro 75) . Farrell turns to postnormal science as a way of answering Marcuse's call and as a way of speaking to the fundamental political content of questions of ecological sustainability, the definition of which cannot be left to science alone. In the postnormal science discourse, "the lines between science and politics and between facts and values have become blurred" (Biro 83) . Farrell rightly argues that the kind of science that leads to environmental damage cannot be the same science that seeks to fix the problem. Steven Logan
The two essays in Part Two, "Critical Theory, Life, and Nature," address and critique deep ecology philosophies and practices, arguing that conceptualizations of nature are not about mastery or control, but about the complex relation between inner nature and external nature. In his essay "Sacred Identity and the Sacrificial Spirit," D. Bruce Martin argues that "reconciliation with nature through a non-dominating mimesis of the Other in nature, or mimetic identification, will allow us to abandon the logic of sacrifice that results in ... self-domination" (Biro 112 ). For Martin, remembrance of nature is not about a return to an "original, immediate relation to nature," as deep ecology expresses it, but a "nature that has yet to exist," that brings to light the past suffering of a repressed internal nature (Biro 122; 123) . The obverse of this is repressed mimesis: inner nature is not attributed to the subject but to the object. The repressed mimetic impulse is acted out upon the object, often in violent ways. Subjective reason can only dominate external nature "by imitating its rigidity and despiritualizing itself in turn" (Adorno and Horkheimer, quoted in Biro 116).
Colin Campbell's essay raises one of the most complex paradoxical questions of this anthology: How can separation of humans from their environment deepen the feeling of dependency on that environment? Vogel's answer is through a realization that the environment, if not nature, is a human creation. Campbell provides a more complex answer through his reading of German philosopher Hans Jonas' philosophy of the "unity of life," of which he attempts a Marcusean imminent critique "to draw out repressed inner potentials" in Jonas' panvitalism (Biro 143) . Jonas' philosophy sees no line of separation between subject and object: "the sense of life within me is relatively extended, relatively continuous with the entire universe" (Biro 144 ). The problem is that the dialectical counterpart to Jonas' panvitalism is an aggressive desire for separation rooted in fear and guilt. Campbell turns to Marcuse's understanding of the dialectical PhaenEx relationship between Eros and Thanatos, life and death, as a corrective. To change the balance away from Thanatos (toil, fear, guilt) and in favour of Eros (play, pleasure, and an absence of surplus repression), is not just to live a greener life or to subscribe to deep ecological philosophies, but rather to offer a fundamental critique of the inequalities of capitalism and to address the "social, material and cultural conditions that produce fear" (Biro 216-7).
In Part Three of Biro's anthology, "Alienation and the Aesthetic," we find the questions raised by Vogel again coming to the fore. Donald Burke, who takes the antithesis to Vogel's position, writes that there is an exit from the dialectic of enlightenment and it is to be located in the "non-dominating nature of aesthetic rationality" (Biro 166) . In an inversion of the usual invocations of the end of nature, he argues that a concept or idea of nature free from domination has yet to be born. Burke finds this in Adorno's concept of the cultural landscape. Burke points out, first, that the bringing together of landscape and culture is contingent upon the "abolition of scarcity" (Biro 180) . A landscape that is "etched by the real suffering of the past" also hints at a "utopian image" that would bring about a "reconciliation of culture and nature" (Biro 181 ). The examples from Adorno which Burke cites seems banal in comparison to these claims-houses built from local materials or buildings incorporated into the landscape alone are hardly the stuff of utopia-lending credence to Vogel's critique that Adorno's non-identity of nature cannot offer an adequate response to ecological crises.
In his essay "Fear and the Unknown: Nature, Culture, and the Limits of Reason," Shane Gunster agrees with Vogel's critique of Adorno, but he also reminds us that we should neither reduce Adorno's interpretation of nature to simply the non-identity of Negative Dialectics, nor should we align it with "the fear of the unknown" that is the driving force behind the dialectic of enlightenment. Gunster argues that a sublime view of nature's otherness, an unknowable part of Steven Logan nature that humans should respect and be in awe of rather than fear and thus try to control, reinforces "experiences of helplessness and disempowerment" common under capitalism (Biro 211 ). The need for immediate action on the ecological front means that limiting reason in favour of a humbleness in the face of the ecological sublime is "spectacularly irresponsible" (Biro 212) .
Gunster seeks to rescue the dialectical character of Adorno's thought by suggesting that humans can both be sublimely enthralled by nature or ruthlessly rational in their deconstruction of it, depending on the context. Gunster concludes his essay by suggesting that sustainable and ethical limits can only be set once we use communication technologies "to understand, experience, and master the enormous power that we collectively possess but do not yet control to shape and construct our social as well as our natural environment" (Biro 224, emphasis mine).
I would argue that Gunster does not do enough to connect his critique of sublimity with the question of mastery and control. During the BP oil disaster, the webcam was the public's experience of nature-a sublime experience. Yet at the same time, the sublime is not only about nature. As Allan Stoekl recently argued, there is a sublime to the incalculability of the external costs of environmental crises like the BP oil disaster-how do we even go about calculating the costs of the 650 million litres of renegade oil or of even everyday activities like driving a car? 1 To think that humans can fully understand, imagine, or even calculate the costs of this crisiseliminating the unknown-displays a blind faith in calculating reason, and negates the possibility that an ecological sublime could be an anti-capitalist position as well.
Biro's own essay, which concludes the section on "Alienation and the Aesthetic," provides a good counterpart to Burke's essay because it speaks to the very difficulty of realizing a space both socially and psychically free from domination, and where "mediation-necessarily including critical reflection on the world as it exists-can take place" (Biro 238) . Although PhaenEx humans now have both the knowledge and the power to end the domination of nature, enlightenment "is turning itself into an outright deception of the masses" (Adorno and Horkheimer 34). What do you get when the Culture Industry, as mass deception, meets the problems of environmental sustainability? The spectacle of climate porn! The pessimistic discourse of climate porn "presents the obscene possibilities of catastrophic climate change as little more than a spectacle to be passively consumed" (Biro 242 ). The more perversely catastrophic the film, the more anaemic a response it provokes. The BP webcam presents an interesting case here. Not a film with a narrative, it certainly qualifies as a kind of pornography of the visual, something like a three-month long ejaculation. But as Galison and Jones note, its being made public was a political success and it prompted BP to revise its very conservative claims on the amount of oil gushing from the well.
2 Echoing Vogel, Biro writes that spectators need to see the images from these films or videos as their "own creation" (Biro 238) . He concludes that other ways of imagining nature must replace the "act of seeing" (Biro 245 ). The problem with Biro's conclusion-that we need a "sustainable and humane society ...
[which] will require environmental communication that is geared toward the expression and realization of self-consciously humane values" (Biro 246)-is that it is so vague as to be ineffectual. Following Benjamin's line of thought, all destruction must come with a corresponding ecstatic creation. But to give birth to something new requires first that humanity puts the brakes on technological progress for its own sake, to first "make whole what has been smashed,"
(Benjamin, "On the Concept of History" 392) rather than incessantly pushing forward to the ecological catastrophes that await.
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